One thing I like about the New Yorker is that it usually presents things in simple terms. Joan Acocella, for example, makes dance accessible to the layperson without dumbing it down (which is especially useful for me because my sister, a dancer, is always impressed when I can say something). And so, when I started reading Outsmarted, John Lanchester’s review of several books on the causes of the financial crisis, I expected, finally, a clear explanation of all those arcane instruments — credit-default swaps, CDOs, etc. — that made the economy go bust.
Alas, I was disappointed. Lanchester succumbs to the same problems that so many financial writers do: vagueness, jargon, imprecision. He uses common words — like “sell” — in ways only understood by finance guys, and he makes logical leaps too large for anyone unfamiliar with the concepts he is trying to illuminate. Consider this passage:
[J.P. Morgan] could sell the risk that a borrower won’t be able to pay back his debt.
I would wager that very few readers really understood this sentence, for two reasons. First, it is not immediately apparent what it means to transfer risk, or even that risk can be transferred at all. Even a reader with an insurance policy — a financial instrument whose express purpose is to transfer risk — probably wouldn’t describe it in those terms. Lanchester could make this passage more accessible by developing the analogy with insurance that he touches on earlier.
Second, and more importantly, it simply does not make sense, using the traditional meaning of the word “sell,” to talk about “selling risk.” Risk is a bad thing, a liability. Nobody’s buying. Finance types think of assets like mathematicians think of numbers: there are positive ones and negative ones. Adding a positive number is like subtracting a negative one; buying an asset is like selling a liability. In this world, selling negative things makes sense: you give someone the negative asset, and you get some negative money, i.e. you pay someone to take something bad off your hands. Confusing? Yes. And yet Lanchester plunges into this lexicon without even a warning.
In the real world, we only buy and sell positive things. Lanchester should write with that in mind, describing transactions in terms of assets instead of liabilities. For example, the passage above could become:
J.P. Morgan could buy insurance against a borrower defaulting on his debt.
In this construction, the flows of money are the same — J.P. Morgan is paying someone to take on a risk — but they are described in terms of positive numbers (buying assets) instead of negative ones (selling liabilities). My version might not smack of Wall Street, but I bet a lot more readers would understand it.
As the article continues and the financial instruments become ever more arcane, Lanchester’s treatment becomes ever more opaque. Take this passage discussing that famous yet peculiarly-named device — no, not the Snuggie — the credit-default swap:
Bill Demchak, a “structured finance” star a J.P. Morgan, took the lead in creating bundles of credit-default swaps — insurance against default — and selling them to investors. The investors would get the streams of revenue, according to the risk-and-reward level they chose; the bank would get insurance against its loans, and fees for setting up the deal.
There are numerous confusing or erroneous bits in this excerpt. First, to the layperson, it is not immediately apparent which party to a swap is the buyer and which is the seller. Even if you understand the flow of payments, Lanchester leaves you wondering, what does it mean to sell one of these things? Lanchester should clarify: the party assuming the risk is the seller; the other party, who makes periodic payments, is the buyer. Not surprisingly, the same convention is used in insurance: you buy an insurance policy just like Goldman Sachs bought credit-default swaps from AIG.
This clarification highlights Lanchester’s second and more grave error. He states that J.P. Morgan sold swaps yet “[got] insurance against its loans.” Clearly, he has confused the parties to the contract. It took me a while to unravel this problem. I’m sure most readers just ignored it and moved on, confused. This is the sort of error that seems innocent on face but in fact erodes the foundation, the consistency of basic concepts, that a novice reader requires.
I think I’ve bashed Lanchester enough, so let me give him a reprieve. A big source of confusion in financial writing isn’t the writers but the concepts themselves. They’re baroque, and they’re poorly named. The credit-default swap is a prime example. Even if you understand typical swap contracts, which involve two people trading (swapping) similar assets — for example, two series of loan repayments — you probably won’t understand a credit-default swap without some investigation. That’s because in normal swaps, the assets exchanged are similar; in a credit-default swap, they’re not: one party makes a series of payments while the other makes a single payment only if an event occurs (default on a loan). This instrument, really, shouldn’t be called a swap any more than me buying a sandwich should. Sure, I’m swapping money for sustenance, but that’s beside the point. Credit-default swaps should be called what they are: insurance!
I’m going to concede that my explanations, like the one above, aren’t as fun to read as the New Yorker with its lyrical style. But function trumps form. I’m still waiting for the financial writer that can achieve both.